1Cadre de l'atelier
| Objective | Define the study and project framework and its business and technical scope. |
|---|---|
| Inputs | Results of a previous risk analysis, if available. |
| Participants | Management, business teams, CISO, and IT management. |
| Sorties | Scoping elements (participants and schedule); missions, business values and supporting assets; feared events rated by severity; security baseline and identified gaps. |
The workshop comprises four activities: 1-1 define the study framework, 1-2 define the business and technical scope, 1-3 identify feared events, 1-4 determine the security baseline.
2The risk-management pyramid
The second EBIOS RM fundamental combines two complementary approaches, both developed throughout Workshop 1.
Workshop 1 alone covers the pyramid's two lower levels through the security baseline. The top—risk scenarios—requires Workshops 2 to 4. Both approaches complement each other: the regulatory and normative context determines which frameworks form the security baseline; do not confuse the regulatory context with a framework.
3Missions, business values, and supporting assets
Activity 1.2. Three nested concepts must not be confused:
Mission
The function, purpose, and reason for existence of the subject under study. Ultimately, there should be only one or two missions.
Business value
A component important to the organisation in fulfilling its mission: a service, support function, project stage, information, or know-how. Five to ten business values are a sufficient basis.
Supporting asset
An information-system component on which one or more business values rely—digital, physical, or organisational, such as a server, network, technical room, or project team.
Example
| Commanditaire | The school |
|---|---|
| Context | A 15-year-old pupil hacks the school system to improve their grades. |
| Mission | Managing school results to assess pupils |
| Business value | Pupils' grades (information) |
| Supporting asset | School information system |
Example RACI matrix (Activity 1.1)
| Activity | Pierre | Paul | Marjorie | Jacques |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Identify the appropriate security baseline | R | A | C | I |
| Comply with the frameworks | R | A | I | I |
| Assess the ecosystem threat level | C | C | R | A |
| Analyse high-level scenarios | i | C | A | C |
R = Responsible · A = Accountable · C = Consulted · I = Informed
4Feared events and severity scale
Activity 1.3. A feared event is associated with a business value and concerns a security criterion—availability, integrity, or confidentiality. It describes what must not happen, together with its impact and severity.
| Level | Definition |
|---|---|
| G1 · Mineur | No operational impact on activity performance or the safety of people and property. The organisation overcomes the situation without significant difficulty. |
| G2 · Significatif | Reduced activity performance without impact on the safety of people and property. The organisation overcomes the situation with some difficulty in degraded mode. |
| G3 · Important | Severe activity-performance degradation, potentially with significant impact on the safety of people and property. The organisation overcomes the situation with serious difficulty in highly degraded mode. |
| G4 · Critique | The organisation is unable to perform all or part of its activity, potentially with severe impact on the safety of people and property. The organisation's survival is threatened. |
5The security baseline
Activity 1.4 identifies frameworks applicable to the subject under study—information-security policy, GDPR, ANSSI cyber-hygiene guide, ISO 27001 Annex A, sector regulations—and then measures gaps between those frameworks and the current situation. Every gap is a potentially exploitable vulnerability reused when building operational scenarios in Workshop 4.